

- be crucial to juxtapose Schelling's adulation of *Ein-Bildung* as the gestation of intellect and reason and his fear of 'false imagination' as the very faculty of evil. Which is more than one can do on the periphery.
13. Cf. Schelling's earlier remarks (358) on the 'circle' of time and eternity, a circle which precludes both priority in time and priority of essence.
 14. The notion of 'absolute indifference' is crucial for Schelling's thinking from early on – for example, in the period of his struggles with the subjective idealism of Fichte, the period of his 1795 essay, 'Vom Ich als Prinzip'. (I am grateful to Peter Dews for this reminder.) Cf. the crucial role of 'absolute indifference' in Hegel's *Logic*, as the 'Becoming of Essence', the culmination of the doctrine of Being, which I can only note here without commentary. (See *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Part I, 'Objective Logic', Division 3, 'Measure', Chapter 3, 'The Becoming of Essence'.) Perhaps it is also worth noting that in his account of human genitality (in the 1805–06 Jena lectures on *Rechtsphilosophie*) Hegel designates the uterus as *das Indifferente*. See Krell, 'Pitch: Genitality/Excrementality: From Hegel to Crazy Jane', *boundary 2*, 12, 2 (Winter 1984), 113–41, esp. p. 120.
 15. See *De la grammologie* (Paris: Minuit, 1967), pp. 207–34 and 441–45.
 16. Cf. the phrase *der notwendige Weg zur endlichen wirklichen Differenzierung*, from the *Stuttgarter Privatvorlesungen* (7, 426).
 17. On this system which is no longer system', a system destroyed by the scission of ground and existence, a cut no *Seynsfüge* can anneal, see M. Heidegger, *Schellings Abhandlung über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit* (1809) (Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1971), esp. p. 194. See also Heidegger's remarkable account of longing (*die Sehnsucht*) as longing for the other (*ein Anderes*), p. 150.

Perception, Categorical Intuition and Truth in Husserl's Sixth 'Logical Investigation'

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The sixth *Logical Investigation* has played a central role in the development of Husserl's own thought and of the phenomenological movement as well. This text works out a new phenomenological understanding of truth, which is indeed what any phenomenological 'theory of knowledge' necessarily aims at providing. This notion of truth brings the phenomenological investigation of the cognitive achievements of intentional consciousness to an end and it also, inevitably, confronts Husserl with the issue of a phenomenological ontology. It is, in particular, the notion of a 'categorical intuition' which shows clearly how the epistemological and ontological stakes are inseparably linked. On the one hand, the categorical intuition is the true answer given to logical psychologism by a phenomenological theory of knowledge: it is about the intuitive givenness of ideal objects. The analysis of this phenomenon also shows the encompassing unity of all elements belonging to a phenomenological theory of cognition: signitive and intuitive intentional acts, sensuous and categorical intuitions, acts of thought and acts of language. On the other hand, the categorical intuition reveals the ontological distinction between sensuous and ideal entities, it forces one to investigate the difference between entities and their being, and it also shows, as Husserl says with Kant, that 'being is no real predicate'.

My text has no other pretense than to report how these issues are treated in the sixth *Logical Investigation*. Rather than developing a personal line of interpretation, I simply wish to familiarize the reader with Husserl's understanding of truth and the way it takes advantage of a phenomenological analysis of intentionality. An account such as this one can not only prepare us for a critical evaluation of Husserl's thought, it also indicates elements of an interpretation that are present already in my report. For example, my insistence on the fact that the legitimate interest in the unity of cognitive life and the unity of ontological and epistemological issues ought not lead us to overlook the *diversity* of these phenomena might be a trace of such a personal interpretation.

INTUITIVELY FULFILLED CATEGORIAL ACTS AS COGNITIVE ACTS
IN THE STRICT SENSE

The key concept in Husserl's doctrine of truth is clearly the concept of *intuitive fulfillment*. In the sixth *Logical Investigation* in particular, this concept receives detailed consideration. It is only in relation to the phenomenological process of fulfillment that the status and function of the concepts of cognition, evidence, and truth can be determined with greater precision. A fulfillment is a cognitive process in which an empty intention or assertion is brought into synthetic connection with a corresponding intuitive act such that by way of this synthesis the intention is confirmed and corroborated or, respectively, disappointed.¹ This complex interconnection among different forms of intentional consciousness can be broken down schematically into the following three elements: a) the act to be fulfilled or the (partially) empty act; b) the fulfilling act; and c) the act conjoining both these acts synthetically. With all three elements it is a question of relatively independently demarcated immanent experiences or psychical activities in which consciousness is intentionally related to objects. The synthetic nexus (c), which conjoins the fulfilling act with the act to be fulfilled, has the form of a synthesis of identification (§ 8). The *identity* constituted in this synthesis concerns the two conjoined acts (a and b) in accordance with the moments responsible for their intentional function (their 'intentional essence'). The two acts coincide (at least partially) in respect to their intentional relation to the object. They refer to the same object. However, the synthesis of identity of the two acts becomes epistemologically relevant only when both acts possess a different cognitive value (cf. §§ 13, 16). This *difference* between the two acts concerns their 'cognitive essence' (§ 28), that is, it concerns the manner in which each of these acts *intuitively* presents its intentional object (the same intentional object), and brings this object to intuitive (or partially intuitive or non-intuitive) givenness. In the *Logical Investigations* Husserl understands this intuitive givenness of the object as an act which apprehends primitive, that is, preintentional contents of consciousness and intentionally refers them to the object. Through this mode of apperception these contents become intuitively representative data or appearances of the object (§§ 14b, 22). Husserl also says that by dint of this apperception of primitive sensational data the intentional act 'represents [*repräsentiert*] its object. The cognitive difference between the fulfilling act and the act to be fulfilled, hence, the difference between two intentional acts which intend the same object, thus derives from their mode of intuitive representation [*Repräsentation*] or from the range and richness of the sensational material apperceived in both acts at any given moment. Formally conceived, the process of fulfillment is thus a complex act which brings two acts

into synthetic relation in respect to both the identity of their intentional object and the difference between their intuitive representations of this object.

Let us now consider somewhat more closely the case of the synthesis of fulfillment in which an empty assertion is epistemologically proven by means of the intuitional self-givenness of its object. The assertion, 'The black bird flies off', is thus fulfilled in synthetic connection with our perceiving the asserted state of affairs. But can one account for the bird's *being* black, its determination *as* bird and *as the* bird, by means of the spectacle which presents itself to our eyes? Furthermore, might not what we see be expressed lingually in other ways than the one we have hit upon? Both questions lead us to the insight, firstly, that a sensuous perception can fulfill a (predicative) assertion only in limited measure, and, secondly, that an assertion owes its meaning only partially and indirectly to the lingually expressed perception. In Husserl's terminology, this means that in a perceptual judgment the lingual signs in the authentic sense express not the perception itself but the judgmental meaning. This meaning is consummated in a categorical meaning-intention and it is through this meaning that the assertion acquires its reference to the perceptual object (§ 4). The consequence of this is, in turn, that the aforesaid semantical intention is fulfilled not by a purely sensuous intuition but by a categorical intuition. Yet before we investigate more closely this synthetic nexus of categorical meaning-intention and categorical intuition, we must bring to mind, at least in broad outline, what it is that makes up the essence of a *categorical act* as such.

According to Husserl, categorical acts are mainly acts of conjoining, relating, distinguishing, and so on. These are complex acts which relate diverse, pre-given, intentional objects to one another and bring them into synthetic unity under a categorical point of view, for example, that of the part-whole relationship. As a complex or synthetic act, the categorical intention presupposes both the acts brought into synthetic unity and the intentional objects of these acts. The performance of the synthetic act is 'founded' in the performance of the synthesized acts (§§ 46, 48). As a thus founded, intentional act, the categorical act refers to a higher-order intentional objectivity first made present by the categorical act itself (§ 43). However, it is extremely important that one not understand the performance of the categorical act as an action which modifies real objects by means of physical manipulation (§ 61). Rather, the achievement of the categorical act consists in the merely intellectual formation and articulation of a pre-given stuff or in the merely logical transformation of a stuff already formed categorially. Yet if the categorical act is not a sensuous, physical activity, neither is its intentional object a sensuous, physical object. It is not an object, in other words, which one can see with one's eyes or upon which one can sit. Contrasting them with real, empirical objects, or sensuous objects, Husserl calls categorical objects 'higher-order' objects or 'ideal' objects (§ 46).

One must not, however, permit oneself to be misled by this terminology into regarding all categorical objects as essences. A state of affairs which I assert, that a dove is now sitting on my windowsill, for example, is no less an ideal, categorical object than is the concept of a particular number or the formal-logical concept 'object-as-such'. If, with Husserl, one calls all categorical objects 'ideal', then one must distinguish between empirical-ideal (or 'sensuous-mixed') and *a priori*-ideal (or 'pure') categorical objects (cf. § 60).

According as the intentional object of a categorical act is intuitively given or merely represented by a sign, one distinguishes between intuitive and significative or empty categorical acts. Significative categorical acts are the meaning-intentions conjoined with empty assertive acts of speech; but they are also the calculative operations carried out in accordance with an arithmetical calculus. Empty assertive acts of speech are distinguished from technical calculation, however, in not being a surrogate for operations of thought that are incapable of intuitive performance. Rather, such acts of speech gain cognitive relevance only when they are fulfilled by a corresponding categorical intuition. In this categorical intuition, the categorical referent of the speech-act is no longer merely intended, empty asserted; rather, it is itself given in intuition. In the sixth *Logical Investigation*, Husserl conceives this intuitional self-giveness of a categorical object largely in analogy to the self-giveness of a *sensuous* object, and he postulates a categorical form of intuitive representation. However, in the 'Foreword' to the second edition of 1920, Husserl remarks expressly that he 'no longer approves of the doctrine of categorical representation' (V). It was the fatal error of this doctrine to define categorical representation as the *categorical* apprehension of a *sensuous* apprehensional content. Yet apart from this logical difficulty, it is not even clear in phenomenological terms, at least with respect to the pure categorical objects or formal categories, what could serve the latter as an intuitional representative (in the sense of immanent sensuous self-giveness). Husserl's most convincing answer to the question of the intuitional givenness of categorical objects must be sought in his later doctrine of eidetic variation. This is so even though this doctrine does not satisfactorily take into account either the distinction between 'sensuous-mixed' and 'pure' essences or the distinction between a generalizing and a formalizing grasp of essences.² Nevertheless, and this is already true of the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl resists the temptation to conceive categorical intuition in strict analogy to sensuous intuition. Indeed, as an essentially synthetic act, categorical intuition is distinguished in principle from the immediacy of sensuous seeing. Simply by being a *categorical* act, categorical intuition is a founded act. In addition, categorical intuition is also a founded act insofar as, being a cognitive act, it is a dependent moment in the synthesis of fulfillment. Nor is a categorical intuition, as a cognitive act, anything like an '*intuitus originarius*'. Rather, it is a possible moment in the complex process of a

'continuous enhancement of fulfillment', a process which is founded in sensuous experience.

Yet what does one really mean in saying that categorical intuition is to be designated as a cognitive act only insofar as it is a moment in the synthesis of fulfillment, that is, only insofar as it stands in synthetic connection with an act in need of fulfillment? It means in the first place that merely having the object intuitively given does not yet constitute a cognitive act. The intuitional givenness of the object is epistemologically relevant only once it has justified a cognitive pretension or satisfied a cognitive interest. Only in synthetic agreement with a corresponding empty representation, a 'lack' (§ 21), does an intuitive act become a cognitive act. For Husserl, as for Kant, mere intuition is epistemologically irrelevant, or 'blind', if it has not been subsumed under a corresponding empty intention and thereby been 'classified'. Correlatively, the empty intention is a merely 'empty' presumption if it lacks intuitional confirmation, differentiation, and 'approximation' to the intended object 'itself'. The fact that this empty intention, which is to be fulfilled in intuition, is by and large only partially empty (or already partially fulfilled) changes nothing in regard to the general characterization of the synthetic cognitive nexus of emptiness and fullness. By contrast, it is of decisive importance that it is the synthesis of fulfillment typical of *categorical* acts which is first able phenomenologically to found the strict concept of cognition, that is, the cognition of something as something.

If, with Husserl, one defines the empty categorical intention as a significative intention, and this, in turn, principally as a categorical meaning-intention, then the intuitually fulfilled speech-act, that is, the assertion which has been justified by the intentional givenness of its object, proves to be the authentic paradigm for the act of cognition in the strict sense. The synthetic nexus of fulfillment, connecting a meaning-intention and a corresponding categorical intuition, can also be described as a synthesis of the intentional objects of these acts. Talk of the cognition of an object as something is particularly well suited to this objectively oriented description of the synthesis of fulfillment which, following Kant, may be called a 'recognition of the object in the concept' (cf. § 8). It is striking that this concept of cognition would not even be susceptible of phenomenological formulation, did Husserl not have at his disposal the structure of a merely empty intended, that is, possibly nonexistent intentional object: the epistemological reality of the referent can be conceived and proven only against the background of the possible absence or unreality of this referent.

THE TRUTH OF JUDGMENTS AND THE LAWS OF AUTHENTIC THINKING

Cognition, and for Husserl this means essentially *scientific* cognition, is a

complex act of satisfied cognitive interest or justified cognitive pretension. Yet what is it toward which this interest is directed, and what does the cognitive intention pretend or posit? If we continue to confine ourselves to the case of linguistically mediated acts of cognition, then the pretension lies in insisting that matters really stand just as we assert that they do. Regarded with greater precision, however, this pretension can be understood in still different ways, namely, 1) as an assertion about the actual existence of the object of reference; 2) as an assertion that certain properties actually belong to the object asserted to be of such and such a complexion; 3) as an assertion that the object is not merely thus and so but rather is *exclusively* thus and so and is not additionally otherwise. Since Husserl understands reference in respect of the meaning-intention, and since, according to Husserl, every intentional act not only designates (denotes) its object but at the same time also determines (connotes) it, the first and second pretensions listed above cannot be separated from one another. A valid act of cognition is thus either an assertion which says nothing more of the object than what is at the same time given in intuition; or it is an intuitively fulfilled assertion which says everything that can be said positively about the corresponding object. As assertions fully fulfilled in intuition, both assertions are regarded by Husserl as *evident* acts of cognition. For the first assertion, however, evidence means intuitive 'confirmation through a corresponding and fully adapted perception', whereas the second assertion is evident in the sense of the 'most complete (or 'ultimate' (§39)) synthesis of fulfillment' (§38).

Evidence thus exhibits varying degrees of completeness; and even evidence in the sense of an intention fully satisfied in intuition is, generally speaking, the result of a complex, and that is to say gradually progressive process of fulfillment. In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl defines the goal regulating this process of steadily enhanced fulfillment as ultimate or adequate evidence. The telos implied in our cognitive interest is thus the complete 'agreement between what is meant and what is given as such' (§39), 'adequation to the "thing itself"' (§37). This consummation of the 'ultimate synthesis of fulfillment' is a synthetic act of phenomenological consciousness which forms the legitimate origin of the concepts 'evidence in the strict sense', 'truth', and 'being'. In this connection, wholly oriented toward the process of fulfillment or the act of cognition, 'being' means nothing other than the object's 'truly-being' or actually 'subsisting' (§39). If one defines truth, in an initial sense, as the objective correlate of the ultimate synthesis of fulfillment, and defines the consummation of this synthesis as evidence, then evidence is the synthetic experience of the 'full agreement between what is meant and what is given as such'; that is, it is the 'immanent experience of truth', the intuitive proof that an object of cognition 'truly is'. If, by contrast, one orients truth, in a second sense, not toward the gradually fulfilled agreement between what is meant and

what is given, but toward the agreement between the act of intending and the act of intuiting, then truth is no longer synonymous with actually-being, but rather with the idea of evidence, that is, that which belongs essentially to the experience of the ultimate synthesis of fulfillment.

These comments from the sixth *Logical Investigation* are by no means unproblematical, nor are they Husserl's final word concerning the problems of evidence and truth. In particular, the orientation of the strong concept of evidence toward the concept of the *adequate* synthesis of fulfillment appears to be questionable. Since the demand for adequate self-giveness of the object cannot be satisfied in large areas of scientific cognition, including the area of logical, a priori cognition, one must ask whether the function of the principle of evidence as a possible methodological norm for phenomenological science is not thereby undermined. One can also ask in general whether the orientation of scientific cognition toward the telos of adequation does not rather destroy than found the idea of a rational progress in cognition. We cannot here enter further into these questions. Instead, we should like to meditate briefly upon those positive aspects of the Husserlian theory of truth which promise still to bear fruit.

It is a primary characteristic of Husserl's concept of cognition and truth that the intuitionistic demand for the self-giveness of the object is not understood sensu strictu. Husserl understands the epistemologically relevant form of the intuitional self-giveness of the object as a result of subjective, synthetic activity, not, for example, as the mere possession of 'little things' [*Dingeichen*] which function in consciousness as causally conditioned representatives of the thing-in-itself. Intuitional representation of the thing is essentially apprehension of a hyletic stuff and actually establishes truth only in the synthesis of fulfillment, namely, when a connection has been established between the intuition and a cognitive intention. Accordingly, 'adequation to the thing itself' (§37) does not mean agreement of representatives in consciousness with the represented and in itself fully determinate thing-in-itself. It means rather an agreement, within the phenomenologically determined consciousness, between the intention and the givenness of the ultimately differentiated object. We shall not dispute the fact that in the sixth *Logical Investigation* Husserl was not yet able fully to free himself from the old concept of adequation (*adequatio rei et intellectus*). Yet the true sense of his remarks points clearly in the direction of an agreement, in fulfillment, between various subjective acts. It thus points at once in the direction of a concept of truth oriented primarily toward the coherence of cognitive life. In any case, it is perfectly clear that the old problem of the 'bridge' between subjective, cognitive activity and objective thing no longer presents itself for Husserl, and that even 'verification' in the sense of the comparison of lingual assertions with the 'actual' constitution of the thing as it is 'in itself' can not count for him as a criterion of truth.

Truth rather concerns the agreement among various intentional acts or their intentional objects. The phenomenological analysis of truth is especially dedicated to formulating the ideal conditions for the possibility of this agreement.

If we try now to investigate in greater detail the general conditions for this agreement in the case of lingual judgmental truth, this may not be taken to mean that judging is for Husserl the most primordial site of truth. It is, of course, correct that categorical acts are cognitive acts in a distinguished sense; yet not all categorical acts are lingual judgmental acts. Furthermore, in the definition of truth as 'agreement between what is meant and what is given as such' (the first concept of truth mentioned in the sixth *LI*), 'being-true' is a predicate belonging not to a judgmental act but to a state of affairs.

Husserl defines the concept of judgmental truth by taking as his point of departure the immanent experience of agreement between the meaningful speech-act animated by a cognitive interest, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a corresponding act of categorical intuition in which the object of reference is given. Phenomenological exploration of the ideal conditions for possible judgmental truth thus has the form of an exploration of the conditions for the possible intuitional fulfillment of speech-acts. This, in turn, means nothing other than exploration of the conditions for the performance of categorical intuitions (§8 62f.). The latter conditions fall under two types according as one has in mind the compossibility of categorical forms or their applicability to determinate sensuous stuffs. One must therefore distinguish between analytical and synthetic conditions for categorical intuition or for 'actual and possible fulfillments of meaning.'

On the basis of the intuitional givenness of the sensuous stuff, the synthetic conditions determine whether, in view of the 'respective particularity' of this stuff, a categorical form may be used, or whether a given 'categorical formation' of this stuff is 'actually able to be consummated' (190). By contrast, the analytical conditions abstract from the particular material determination of the sensuous stuffs. That is, they treat these sensuous stuffs as 'determinate but arbitrary' (189) 'variables' (195), maintained 'in identity with themselves' (189) in categorical formation and transformation. The positive task of exploring these analytical conditions concerns the formulation of ideal laws which regulate the 'ideally closed circle of possible transformations of any given form into ever new forms' (190). Thus, for example, according to these analytical laws the transformation of the proposition '*g* is a part of *G*' into '*G* is the whole covering *g*' is valid, whereas its transformation into '*G* is a part of *g*' is not valid. The assertion, '*g* is a part of *G*, and *G* is the whole covering *g*', satisfies the synthetic laws of possible categorical intuition only if the sensuous objects designated by *g* and *G* can be brought actually, and that is to say empirically, into the relationship of part and whole. However, we shall still see that the actualization not only of these synthetic laws, but also of the universally valid

analytical laws, necessarily presupposes perception, i.e., the possibility of the intuitional givenness of individually determined, sensuous objects.

Categorical acts which contradict the analytical and synthetic conditions for their possible intuitive performance, cannot be true. Yet such categorical acts, which can be performed only signifiatively, need not as a consequence be meaningless in the sense of nonsense. Signifiative categorical acts such as lingual expressions are meaningful if they obey the grammatical laws; but the possibility of their being true arises only when *in addition* they obey the laws of possible categorical intuition. If we call the signifiative categorical acts 'inauthentic acts of thought', and the intuitive categorical acts 'authentic acts of thought' (193), then the authentic acts of thought are necessarily subject to the laws of possible inauthentic acts of thought, but the inauthentic acts of thought are not necessarily subject to the laws of possible authentic acts of thought. '... The domain of meanings is much more comprehensive than that of intuition' for there is an 'unlimited multiplicity of complex meanings ... which are, indeed, consolidated into uniform meanings, but meanings to which no possible, uniform correlate of fulfillment can correspond' (192). Thus the only true assertion is the assertion whose meaning-intention, or inauthentic act of thought (193), can be intuitively fulfilled by a corresponding categorical intuition, by a corresponding authentic act of thought. The truth of a lingual utterance, or of a speech-act, is derived from the possibility of performing a corresponding authentic act of thought. This comes about in such a way that, firstly, the meaning-intention (in the unity of fulfillment) corresponds unambiguously with the authentic act of thought; and that, secondly, the meaning-intention finds 'unambiguous expression' in the lingual sign, the 'word' (cf. 191). Centered in the authentic act of thought or categorical intuition, this graduated sequence of unambiguous correspondence or isomorphism of 'word', 'meaning', and 'intuition', implies additionally an unambiguous correspondence between authentic thinking and its objects.

The ideal conditions for the possibility of categorical intuition as such, are correlatively the conditions for the possibility of objects of categorical intuition, and (they are at once the conditions) for the possibility of categorical objects pure and simple' (189).

With these remarks Husserl does not accommodate himself unreservedly to the canon of a realistic theory of meaning which, having received its classical expression in the *De Interpretatione* (cf. 16a) of Aristotle, is oriented toward the unambiguous representations of the 'thing' in certain 'states of the soul', and of these, in turn, in the lingual 'word'? Surely this question may be answered only with a qualified affirmation, for in Husserl's system it is not the thing but authentic thinking which constitutes the supporting pillar for the multilevel complex of representations. In Husserl, the accent shifts, therefore, from the internalization of the external thing to the lingual externalization of

the inwardness of thinking. The truth-value of a speech-act is derived from a corresponding act of authentic thinking. In view of the equivalence between the conditions for possible categorial intuition and the conditions for possible categorial objects, the truth-value of categorial objects can be seen similarly to be derived from a corresponding act of authentic thinking. The adequation of the meaning to the object is but a correlative formulation of the connection of fulfillment between the signitive meaning-intention and the corresponding categorial intuition. Without entering further into a discussion of these questions we would like nonetheless to consider some of the consequences of this Husserlian system of isomorphic correspondence or representation of expression, meaning, intuition, and object of cognition.

One consequence of this representational nexus, centered as it is in the concept of categorial intuition or authentic thinking, concerns the relationship between *language* and *thinking*. To be sure, authentic acts of thought do, under the proper conditions, fulfill meaning-intentions; authentic acts of thought and fulfilled meaning-intentions are 'parallel'; but they are 'not identical'; the latter follow 'faithfully after' the former (§ 63). The authentic acts of thought, upon which the truth-value of cognition essentially depends, are prelingual. Lingual acts of cognition can be valid insofar as they 'follow faithfully after' or give 'unambiguous expression' to these prelingual, intuitive acts of thought (ibid.). This demand for a relationship in which acts of prelingual thinking are unambiguously represented by the 'system of... meanings... expressing them' (ibid.), is problematical insofar as such a demand applies at best to the ideal language functioning as the 'garb' of thinking. It certainly cannot account for the language in which meaning is first instituted, the ordinary language of our usual dealings with lingual signs. The introduction of a prelingual criterion for truth has the further consequence that this criterion becomes to a certain extent private. It does so insofar as the performance of an authentic act of thought or a synthesis of fulfillment is an intrasubjective event which can be made accessible to the intersubjective lingual community of scientific investigators only secondarily.

In the aftermath of Heidegger, attention has also been drawn to the fact that Husserl's derivation of the determination and the being of actual objects from the performance of authentic acts of thought implies a problematical, preliminary decision in respect of the *ontological question*. Much as in the case of lingual expressions, the forms of objects and their being are but mirrorings of the determinations of corresponding acts of cognition. This relationship of representation, too, is one-sided. The being of that which objectively is, is determined with a view to the purely theoretically determined subject of cognition. It is determined, therefore, as being-known just as in the case of the ideal language, one can here ask whether this limited, epistemological understanding of being, represents a merely preliminary restriction or whether it

does not rather represent an anticipatory decision concerning the question of being.

PERCEPTION AS THE FOUNDATION OF TRUE JUDGMENT

Husserl defines judging, but also thinking, as a categorial act. Categorial acts are mainly synthetic acts in which pre-given stuffs are given logical form or in which the resultant logical forms are transformed. This formational activity, however, is not an absolutely independent and spontaneous activity of the understanding, for it presupposes the necessary pre-giveness of ultimately sensuous stuffs.

'It lies in the nature of the case that everything categorial ultimately rests upon sensuous intuition, indeed, that... thought..., apart from a founding sensuousness, is an absurdity' (§ 60).

If we recall that intuitively fulfilled categorial acts were designated as cognitive acts in the strict sense, then the question arises concerning the extent to which the pre-giveness of sensuous stuffs founds not only the essential determination of these acts as categorial acts, but also their truth-value.

Talk of the foundedness of all categorial acts, whether signitive or intuitive, has a double sense according as one understands the concept of founding logically or phenomenologically-genetically. Taken in its logical sense, the foundedness of categorial acts means that as synthetic acts these acts imply the performance of the acts unified by them. Hence, as synthesizing acts, categorial acts are founded in acts of simple relation to the members which are to be synthesized just as the uniform whole is founded in its manifold parts. It is to be observed, withal, that these synthesized members can already be, perchance, (nominalized) categorial objects; that, however, the process of categorial complications has an absolute beginning; and, thus, that all categorial objects are ultimately founded (logically) in sensuous stuffs. If, placing ourselves in a phenomenological attitude, we contemplate the performance of the synthetic act, then it strikes us that the members which are to be synthesized also enjoy a chronological priority over the performance of the synthesizing act. Taken in this second sense, talk of the foundedness of categorial acts thus means that categorial acts are able to be consummated only when the apurtenant partial acts have already been performed.

Let us now pass on to the consideration of that special class of categorial acts capable of bringing fulfillment to signitive acts such as meaning-intentions. In this case, talk of the founding of categorial acts in the pre-giveness of sensuous stuffs acquires a new and narrower sense. In addition to the logical compatibility of the categorial forms employed, there belongs to the performance of a categorial intuition, and especially to the performance of a *synthetic*

categorical intuition the adaptation of these forms to the particularity of the stuffs to which they are applied. Only when these stuffs are *intentionally* or perceptually given in the particularity of their material determination is it assured that one does not incorporate them into an unsuitable categorical nexus. The possible performance of a categorical intuition and the possible truth of a categorical speech-act are thus founded in the perceptual givenness of sensuous objects functioning as stuffs of a logical formation. Thus, for example, the truth of the perceptual judgment, 'The pencil is red', is *founded* in the perception of a red pencil. (Yet the perceptual judgment, or its meaning, is not *contained* in the perception, since no perceptual givenness corresponds with the categorical form of the predicative synthesis of identification.)

What is the status of this necessary foundedness in the sensuous perception of stuffs, however, when we move on from synthetically true judgments to analytically true judgments, such as, 'G is the whole covering g, and g is a part of G'? Still, mere variables function here as stuffs; and variable stuffs, that is, stuffs regarded independently of their particular material determination, 'arbitrary' stuffs, do not at all events fall into the realm of sensuous seeing. On the other hand, stuffs which function as arbitrarily variable, though thoroughly self-identical stuffs of categorical formation, are not for that reason necessarily to be designated as essences, whether material or formal.

In the *Logical Investigations*, Husserl seems clearly to take the view that even the intuitional performance of an *analytical* categorical act is founded in the intuitional givenness of sensuous stuffs, and founded in such a way that in the actual performance of the categorical act there is presupposed, at the very least, a phantasmal presentation of a sensuous object which suits the terms of the categorical form employed (§ 62). In the *Formal and Transcendental Logic*,³ Husserl supplements these early investigations by showing that it is not only in their apprehension that analytically true assertions, especially formal-logical laws, refer to the intuitional givenness of sensuous objects. Rather, even in their application these laws refer ultimately and necessarily to materially determined individuals. If the pure-logical laws come to be understood as laws of possible truth, then their 'idealizing presuppositions' (FTL: §§ 73ff.), related to their possible application in actual experience, require critical clarification. Thus, the formal logic of truth implies assertions which refer not only to materially determined individual entities but also to the intuitive-sensuous experience of such entities. The critical justification of these (implicit) assertions about individual entities is a task which can be accomplished not by formal logic itself but only by a transcendental logic of our living experience of the world. In his effort to found formal logic in a genetic phenomenology, Husserl went as far as to postulate a 'pre-predicative' 'syntactical accomplishment' of this 'founding experience' (cf. FTL: § 86).

The most important yield from Husserl's early analyses of judgmental truth is surely their hint at the necessary founding of acts of lingual cognition in nonlingual cognitive performances. Acts of true judgment are in the main mere lingual realizations or expressions of categorical intuitions or acts of 'authentic thinking', and these acts of authentic thinking are cognitive acts in the strict sense. According to Husserl's conception of the matter, however, authentic thinking is necessarily founded in sensuous intuition, and Husserl, therefore, does not hesitate to designate even these sensuous acts as cognitive acts. It is correct, to be sure, that such prelingual acts can be explored only in the medium of language. Yet Husserl, in contrast with a broad current in present-day philosophical thinking, refuses to conclude from this that all cognitive performances, as a matter of necessity, presuppose language from the very beginning and must consequently be designated as lingual performances.

NOTES

1. E. Husserl, sixth *Logical Investigation*, §§ 6, 8, 11. When not otherwise indicated all references are to this text; page-references are to the German text (*Logische Untersuchungen*, Zweiter Band II. Teil: *Elemente einer phänomenologischen Aufklärung der Erkenntnis*, M. Niemeyer, 1968³), translations are mine.
2. Cf. E. Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine Einführung in die reine Phänomenologie*, § 13.
3. E. Husserl, *Formale und transzendente Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft*, § 82.